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Abstract
The design of personalized incentives or rec-
ommendations to improve user engagement
is gaining prominence as digital platform
providers continually emerge. We propose
a multi-armed bandit framework for match-
ing incentives to users, whose preferences are
unknown a priori and evolving dynamically
in time, in a resource constrained environ-
ment. We design an algorithm that com-
bines ideas from three distinct domains: (i)
a greedy matching paradigm, (ii) the upper
confidence bound algorithm (UCB) for ban-
dits, and (iii) mixing times from the theory of
Markov chains. For this algorithm, we provide
theoretical bounds on the regret and demon-
strate its performance via both synthetic and
realistic (matching supply and demand in a
bike-sharing platform) examples.
1 INTRODUCTION
The theory of multi-armed bandits plays a key role in
enabling personalization in the digital economy (Scott,
2015). Algorithms from this domain have successfully
been deployed in a diverse array of applications includ-
ing online advertising (Lu et al., 2010; Mehta and Mir-
rokni, 2011), crowdsourcing (Tran-Thanh et al., 2014),
content recommendation (Li et al., 2010), and selecting
user-specific incentives (Ghosh and Hummel, 2013; Jain
et al., 2014) (e.g., a retailer offering discounts). On the
theoretical side, this has been complemented by a litany
of near-optimal regret bounds for multi-armed bandit
settings with rich combinatorial structures and complex
agent behavior models (Chen et al., 2016; Gai et al.,
2011; Kveton et al., 2015; Sani et al., 2012). At a high
∗Authors contributed equally.
level, the broad appeal of bandit approaches for allocat-
ing resources to human agents stems from its focus on
balancing exploration with exploitation, thereby allow-
ing a decision-maker to efficiently identify users’ prefer-
ences without sacrificing short-term rewards.
Implicit in most of these works is the notion that in large-
scale environments, a designer can simultaneously allo-
cate resources to multiple users by running independent
bandit instances. In reality, such independent decompo-
sitions do not make sense in applications where resources
are subject to physical or monetary constraints. In simple
terms, matching an agent to a resource immediately con-
strains the set of resources to which another agent can be
matched. Such supply constraints may arise even when
dealing with intangible products. For instance, social
media platforms (e.g., Quora) seek to maximize user par-
ticipation by offering incentives in the form of increased
recognition—e.g., featured posts or badges (Immorlica
et al., 2015). Of course, there are supply constraints on
the number of posts or users that can be featured at a
given time. As a consequence of these coupling con-
straints, much of the existing work on multi-armed ban-
dits does not extend naturally to multi-agent economies.
Yet, another important aspect not addressed by the litera-
ture concerns human behavior. Specifically, users’ pref-
erences over the various resources may be dynamic—
i.e. evolve in time as they are repeatedly exposed to the
available options. The problem faced by a designer in
such a dynamic environment is compounded by the lack
of information regarding each user’s current state or be-
liefs, as well as how these beliefs influence their prefer-
ences and their evolution in time.
Bearing in mind these limitations, we study a multi-
armed bandit problem for matching multiple agents to a
finite set of incentives1: each incentive belongs to a cate-
1We use the term incentive broadly to refer to any resource
or action available to the agent. That is, incentives are not lim-
ited to monetary or financial mechanisms.
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gory and global capacity constraints control the number
of incentives that can be chosen from each category. In
our model, each agent has a preference profile or a type
that determines its rewards for being matched to differ-
ent incentives. The agent’s type evolves according to a
Markov decision process (MDP), and therefore, the re-
wards vary over time in a correlated fashion.
Our work is primarily motivated by the problem faced
by a technological platform that seeks to not just max-
imize user engagement but also to encourage users to
make changes in their status quo decision-making pro-
cess by offering incentives. For concreteness, consider
a bike-sharing service—an application we explore in our
simulations—that seeks to identify optimal incentives for
each user from a finite bundle of options—e.g., varying
discount levels, free future rides, bulk ride offers, etc.
Users’ preferences over the incentives may evolve with
time depending on their current type, which in turn de-
pends on their previous experience with the incentives.
In addition to their marketing benefits, such incentives
can serve as a powerful instrument for nudging users to
park their bikes at alternative locations—this can lead to
spatially balanced supply and consequently, lower rejec-
tion rates (Singla et al., 2015).
1.1 CONTRIBUTIONS AND ORGANIZATION
Our objective is to design a multi-armed bandit algorithm
that repeatedly matches agents to incentives in order to
minimize the cumulative regret over a finite time hori-
zon. Here, regret is defined as the difference in the re-
ward obtained by a problem specific benchmark strategy
and the proposed algorithm (see Definition 1). A prelim-
inary impediment in achieving this goal is the fact that
the capacitated matching problem studied in this work is
NP-Hard even in the offline case. The major challenge
therefore is whether we can achieve sub-linear (in the
length of the horizon) regret in the more general match-
ing environment without any information on the users’
underlying beliefs or how they evolve?
Following preliminaries (Section 2), we introduce
a simple greedy algorithm that provides a 1/3–
approximation to the optimal offline matching so-
lution (Section 3). Leveraging this first contribu-
tion, the central result in this paper (Section 4) is
a new multi-armed bandit algorithm—MatchGreedy-
EpochUCB (MG-EUCB)—for capacitated matching
problems with time-evolving rewards. Our algorithm ob-
tains logarithmic (and hence sub-linear) regret even for
this more general bandit problem. The proposed ap-
proach combines ideas from three distinct domains: (i)
the 1/3–rd approximate greedy matching algorithm, (ii)
the traditional UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002), and
(iii) mixing times from the theory of Markov chains.
We validate our theoretical results (Section 5) by per-
forming simulations on both synthetic and realistic in-
stances derived using data obtained from a Boston-based
bike-sharing service Hubway (hub). We compare our
algorithm to existing UCB-based approaches and show
that the proposed method enjoys favorable convergence
rates, computational efficiency on large data sets, and
does not get stuck at sub-optimal matching solutions.
1.2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Two distinct features separate our model from the ma-
jority of work on the multi-armed bandit problem: (i)
our focus on a capacitated matching problem with finite
supply (every user cannot be matched to their optimal in-
centive), and (ii) the rewards associated with each agent
evolve in a correlated fashion but the designer is unaware
of each agent’s current state. Our work is closest to (Gai
et al., 2011) which considers a matching problem with
Markovian rewards. However, in their model the rewards
associated with each edge evolve independently of the
other edges; as we show via a simple example in Sec-
tion 2.2, the correlated nature of rewards in our instance
can lead to additional challenges and convergence to sub-
optimal matchings if we employ a traditional approach as
in (Gai et al., 2011).
Our work also bears conceptual similarities to the rich
literature on combinatorial bandits (Badanidiyuru et al.,
2013; Chen et al., 2016; Kveton et al., 2014, 2015; Wen
et al., 2015). However, unlike our work, these papers
consider a model where the distribution of the rewards
is static in time. For this reason, efficient learning al-
gorithms leveraging oracles to solve generic constrained
combinatorial optimization problems developed for the
combinatorial semi-bandit setting (Chen et al., 2016;
Kveton et al., 2015) face similar limitations in our model
as the approach of (Gai et al., 2011). Moreover, the re-
wards in our problem may not have a linear structure so
the approach of (Wen et al., 2015) is not applicable.
The novelty in this work is not the combinatorial aspect
but the interplay between combinatorial bandits and the
edge rewards evolving according to an MDP. When an
arm is selected by an oracle, the reward of every edge
in the graph evolves—how it evolves depends on which
arm is chosen. If the change occurs in a sub-optimal di-
rection, this can affect future rewards. Indeed, the dif-
ficulties in our proofs do not stem from applying an or-
acle for combinatorial optimization, but from bounding
the secondary regret that arises when rewards evolve in a
sub-optimal way.
Finally, there is a somewhat parallel body of work
on single-agent reinforcement learning techniques (Azar
et al., 2013; Jaksch et al., 2010; Mazumdar et al., 2017;
Ratliff et al., 2018) and expert selection where the re-
wards on the arms evolve in a correlated fashion as in
our work. In addition to our focus on multi-agent match-
ings, we remark that many of these works assume that the
designer is aware (at least partially) of the agent’s exact
state and thus, can eventually infer the nature of the evo-
lution. Consequently, a major contribution of this work is
the extension of UCB-based approaches to solve MDPs
with a fully unobserved state and rewards associated with
each edge that evolve in a correlated fashion.
2 PRELIMINARIES
A designer faces the problem of matchingm agents to in-
centives (more generally jobs, goods, content, etc.) with-
out violating certain capacity constraints. We model this
setting by means of a bipartite graph (A, I,P) where A
is the set of agents, I is the set of incentives to which the
agents can be matched, and P = A × I is the set of all
pairings between agents and incentives. We sometimes
refer to P as the set of arms. In this regard, a matching is
a set M ⊆ P such that every agent a ∈ A and incentive
i ∈ I is present in at most one edge belonging to M .
Each agent a ∈ A is associated with a type or state θa ∈
Θa, which influences the reward received by this agent
when matched with some incentive i ∈ I. When agent a
is matched to incentive i, its type evolves according to a
Markov process with transition probability kernel Pa,i :
Θa × Θa → [0, 1]. Each pairing or edge of the bipartite
graph is associated with some reward that depends on the
agent–incentive pair, (a, i), as well as the type θa.
The designer’s policy (algorithm) is to compute a match-
ing repeatedly over a finite time horizon in order to max-
imize the expected aggregate reward. In this work, we
restrict our attention to a specific type of multi-armed
bandit algorithm that we refer to as an epoch mixing pol-
icy. Formally, the execution of such a policy α is divided
into a finite number of time indices [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n},
where n is the length of the time horizon. In each time
index k ∈ [n], the policy selects a matching α(k) and
repeatedly ‘plays’ this matching for τk > 0 iterations
within this time index. We refer to the set of iterations
within a time index collectively as an epoch. That is,
within the k–th epoch, for each edge (a, i) ∈ α(k), agent
a is matched to incentive i and the agent’s type is allowed
to evolve for τk iterations. In short, an epoch mixing
policy proceeds in two time scales—each selection of a
matching corresponds to an epoch comprising of τk it-
erations for k ∈ [n], and there are a total of n epochs.
It is worth noting that an epoch-based policy was used
in the UCB2 algorithm (Auer et al., 2002), albeit with
stationary rewards.
Agents’ types evolve based on the incentives to which
they are matched. Suppose that β(k)a denotes the type
distribution on Θa at epoch k and i ∈ I is the incentive
to which agent a is matched by α (i.e., (a, i) ∈ α(k)).
Then, β(k+1)a (θa) =
∑
θ′∈Θa P
τk
a,i(θ
′, θa)β
(k)
a (θ′).
For epoch k, the rewards are averaged over the τk itera-
tions in that epoch. Let rθa,i denote the reward received
by agent a when it is matched to incentive i given type
θ ∈ Θa. We assume that rθa,i ∈ [0, 1] and is drawn from a
distribution Tr(a, i, θ). The reward distributions for dif-
ferent edges and states in Θa are assumed to be indepen-
dent of each other. Suppose that an algorithm α selects
the edge (a, i) for τ iterations within an epoch. The ob-
served reward at the end of this epoch is taken to be the
time-averaged reward over the epoch. Specifically, sup-
pose that the k–th epoch proceeds for τk iterations be-
ginning with time tk—i.e. one plus the total iterations
completed before this—and ending at time tk+1 − 1 =
tk + τk − 1, and that θa(t) denotes agent a’s state at
time t ∈ [tk, tk+1 − 1]. Then, the time-averaged reward
in the epoch is given by rθa(tk)a,i =
1
τk
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
r
θa(t)
a,i .
We use the state as a superscript to denote dependence
of the reward on the agent’s type at the beginning of the
epoch. Finally, the total (time-averaged) reward due to a
matching α(k) at the end of an epoch can be written as∑
(a,i)∈α(k) r
θa(tk)
a,i .
We assume that the Markov chain corresponding to each
edge (a, i) ∈ P is aperiodic and irreducible (Levin et al.,
2009). We denote the stationary or steady-state distribu-
tion for this edge as pia,i : Θa → [0, 1]. Hence, we define
the expected reward for edge (a, i), given its stationary
distribution, to be µa,i = E
[∑
θ∈Θa r
θ
a,ipia,i(θ)
]
where
the expectation is with respect to the distribution on the
reward given θ.
2.1 CAPACITATED MATCHING
Given P = A × I, the designer’s goal at the beginning
of each epoch is to select a matching M ⊆ P—i.e. a
collection of edges—that satisfies some cardinality con-
straints. We partition the edges in P into a mutually ex-
clusive set of classes allowing for edges possessing iden-
tical characteristics to be grouped together. In the bike-
sharing example, the various classes could denote types
of incentives—e.g., edges that match agents to discounts,
free-rides, etc. Suppose that C = {ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξq} de-
notes a partitioning of the edge set such that (i) ξj ⊆ P
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ q, (ii)⋃qj=1 ξj = P , and (iii) ξj∩ξj′ = ∅
for all j 6= j′. We refer to each ξj as a class and for any
given edge (a, i) ∈ P , use c(a, i) to denote the class that
this edge belongs to, i.e., (a, i) ∈ c(a, i) and c(a, i) ∈ C.
Given a capacity vector b = (bξ1 , . . . , bξq ) indexed on
the set of classes, we say that a matching M ⊆ P is a
feasible solution to the capacitated matching problem if:
a) for every a ∈ A (resp., i ∈ I), the matching must
contain at most one edge containing this agent (resp.,
incentive)
b) and, the total number of edges from each class ξj
contained in the matching cannot be larger than bξj .
In summary, the capacitated matching problem can be
formulated as the following integer program:
max
∑
(a,i)∈P w(a, i)x(a, i)
s.t.
∑
i∈I x(a, i) ≤ 1 ∀a ∈ A∑
a∈A x(a, i) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I∑
(a,i)∈ξj x(a, i) ≤ bξj , ∀ξj ∈ C
x(a, i) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀(a, i) ∈ P
(P1)
We use the notation {P, C, b, (w(a, i))(a,i)∈P} for a ca-
pacitated matching problem instance. In (P1), w(a, i)
refers to the weight or the reward to be obtained from the
given edge. The term x(a, i) is an indicator on whether
the edge (a, i) is included in the solution to (P1). Clearly,
the goal is to select a maximum weight matching subject
to the constraints. In our online bandit problem, the de-
signer’s actual goal in a fixed epoch k is to maximize the
quantity
∑
(a,i)∈P r
θa(tk)
a,i x(a, i), i.e., w(a, i) = r
θa(tk)
a,i .
However, since the reward distributions and the current
user type are not known beforehand, our MG-EUCB al-
gorithm (detailed in Section 4.2) approximates this ob-
jective by setting the weights to be the average observed
reward from the edges in combination with the corre-
sponding confidence bounds.
2.2 TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
There are two key obstacles involved in extending tra-
ditional bandit approaches to our combinatorial setting
with evolving rewards, namely, cascading sub-optimality
and correlated convergence. The first phenomenon oc-
curs when an agent a is matched to a sub-optimal arm i
(incentive) because its optimal arm i∗ has already been
assigned to another agent. Such sub-optimal pairings
have the potential to cascade, e.g., when another agent
a1 who is matched to i in the optimal solution can no
longer receive this incentive and so on. Therefore, unlike
the classical bandit analysis, the selection of sub-optimal
arms cannot be directly mapped to the empirical rewards.
Correlated Convergence. As mentioned previously, in
our model, the rewards depend on the type or state of an
agent, and hence, the reward distribution on any given
edge (a, i) can vary even when the algorithm does not
select this edge. As a result, a naı¨ve application of a ban-
dit algorithm can severely under-estimate the expected
reward on each edge and eventually converge to a sub-
optimal matching. A concrete example of the poor con-
vergence effect is provided in Example 1. In Section 4.2,
we describe how our central bandit algorithm limits the
damage due to cascading while simultaneously avoiding
the correlated convergence problem.
Example 1 (Failure of Classical UCB). Consider a
problem instance with two agents A = {a1, a2}, two
incentives I = {i1, i2} and identical state space i.e.,
Θa1 = Θa2 = {θ1, θ2}. The transition matrices and
deterministic rewards for the agents for being matched
to each incentive are depicted pictorially below: we as-
sume that  > 0 is a sufficiently small constant.
θ1 θ2
rθ1a1,i1 = 0 r
θ2
a1,i1
= 1
1

0 1− 
Edge
(a1, i1)
θ1 θ2
rθ1a1,i2 = 0.5 r
θ2
a1,i2
= 0.5

1
1−  0
Edge
(a1, i2)
θ1 θ2
rθ1a2,i1 = 0.5 r
θ2
a2,i1
= 0.5

1
1−  0
Edge
(a2, i1)
θ1 θ21

0 1− 
Edge
(a2, i2)
rθ1a2,i2 = 0 r
θ2
a2,i2
= 1
Agent a1 Agent a2
Figure 1: (a) State transition diagram and reward for each edge:
note that the state is associated with the agent and not the edge.
Clearly, the optimal strategy is to repeatedly chose the
matching {(a1, i1), (a2, i2)} achieving a reward of (al-
most) two in each epoch. An implementation of tra-
ditional UCB for the matching problem—e.g., the ap-
proach in (Chen et al., 2016; Gai et al., 2011; Kveton
et al., 2015)—selects a matching based on the empirical
rewards and confidence bounds for a total of
∑n
k=1 τk
iterations, which are then divided into epochs for con-
venience. This approach converges to the sub-optimal
matching of M = {(a1, i2), (a2, i1)}. Indeed, every
time the algorithm selects this matching, both the agents’
states are reset to θ1 and when the algorithm explores
the optimum matching, the reward consistently happens
to be zero since the agents are in state θ1. Hence, the
rewards for the (edges in the) optimum matching are
grossly underestimated.
3 GREEDY OFFLINE MATCHING
In this section, we consider the capacitated matching
problem in the offline case, where the edge weights are
provided as input. The techniques developed in this sec-
tion serve as a base in order to solve the more general
online problem in the next section. More specifically, we
assume that we are given an arbitrary instance of the ca-
pacitated matching problem {P, C, b, (w(a, i))(a,i)∈P}.
Algorithm 1 Capacitated-Greedy Matching Algorithm
1: function MG((w(a, i))(a,i)∈P , b)
2: G∗ ← ∅, E′ ← P
3: while E′ 6= ∅:
4: Select (a, i) = arg max(a′,i′)∈E′ w(a′, i′)
5: if|G∗ ∩ c(a, i)| < bc(a,i) then
6: G∗ ← G∗ ∪ {(a, i)}
7: E′ ← E′ \ {(a′, i′)} ∀(a′, i′) : a′ = a or i′ = i
else
8: E′ ← E′ \ {(a, i)}
9: return G∗
10: end function
Given this instance, the designer’s objective is to
solve (P1). Surprisingly, this problem turns out to be NP-
Hard and thus cannot be optimally solved in polynomial
time (Garey and Johnson, 1979)—this marks a stark con-
trast with the classic maximum weighted matching prob-
lem, which can be solved efficiently using the Hungarian
method (Kuhn, 1955).
In view of these computational difficulties, we develop
a simple greedy approach for the capacitated matching
problem and formally prove that it results in a one-third
approximation to the optimum solution. The greedy
method studied in this work comes with a multitude of
desirable properties that render it suitable for matching
problems arising in large-scale economies. Firstly, the
greedy algorithm has a running time of O(m2 logm),
where m is the number of agents—this near-linear ex-
ecution time in the number of edges makes it ideal for
platforms comprising of a large number of agents. Sec-
ondly, since the output of the greedy algorithm depends
only on the ordering of the edge weights and is not sen-
sitive to their exact numerical value, learning approaches
tend to converge faster to the ‘optimum solution’. This
property is validated by our simulations (see Figure 2c).
Finally, the performance of the greedy algorithm in prac-
tice (e.g., see Figure 2b) appears to be much closer to the
optimum solution than the 1/3 approximation guaranteed
by Theorem 1 below.
3.1 ANALYSIS OF GREEDY ALGORITHM
The greedy matching is outlined in Algorithm 1. Given
an instance {P, C, b, (w(a, i))(a,i)∈P}, Algorithm 1
‘greedily’ selects the highest weight feasible edge in each
iteration—this step is repeated until all available edges
that are feasible are added to G∗. Our main result in this
section is that for any given instance of the capacitated
matching problem, the matching G∗ returned by Algo-
rithm 1 has a total weight that is at least 1/3–rd that of
the maximum weight matching.
Theorem 1. For any given capacitated matching prob-
lem instance {P, C, b, (w(a, i))(a,i)∈P}, let G∗ denote
the output of Algorithm 1 and M∗ be any other feasi-
ble solution to the optimization problem in (P1) includ-
ing the optimum matching. Then,
∑
(a,i)∈M∗ w(a, i) ≤
3
∑
(a,i)∈G∗ w(a, i).
The proof is based on a charging argument that takes
into account the capacity constraints and can be found
in Section B.1 of the supplementary material. At a high
level, we take each edge belonging to the benchmarkM∗
and identify a corresponding edge inG∗ whose weight is
larger than that of the benchmark edge. This allows us to
charge the weight of the original edge to an edge in G∗.
During the charging process, we ensure that no more than
three edges in M∗ are charged to each edge in G∗. This
gives us an approximation factor of three.
3.2 PROPERTIES OF GREEDY MATCHINGS
We conclude this section by providing a hierarchi-
cal decomposition of the edges in P for a fixed in-
stance {P, C, b, (w(a, i))(a,i)∈P}. In Section 4.1, we
will use this property to reconcile the offline version
of the problem with the online bandit case. Let G∗ =
{g∗1 , g∗2 , . . . , g∗m} denote the matching computed by Al-
gorithm 1 for the given instance such that w(g∗1) ≥
w(g∗2) ≥ . . . ≥ w(g∗m) without loss of generality2. Next,
let G∗j = {g∗1 , g∗2 , . . . , g∗j } for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m—i.e. the j
highest-weight edges in the greedy matching.
For each 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we define the infeasibility set HG∗j
as the set of edges in P that when added to G∗j violates
the feasibility constraints of (P1). Finally, we use LG
∗
j to
denote the marginal infeasibility sets—i.e. LG
∗
1 = H
G∗
1
and
LG
∗
j = H
G∗
j \HG
∗
j−1, ∀ 2 ≤ j ≤ m. (1)
We note that the marginal infeasibility sets denote a mu-
tually exclusive partition of the edge set minus the greedy
matching—i.e.,
⋃
1≤j≤m L
G∗
j = P \ G∗. Moreover,
since the greedy matching selects its edges in the de-
creasing order of weight, for any g∗j ∈ G∗, and every
(a, i) ∈ LG∗j , we have that w(g∗j ) ≥ w(a, i).
Armed with our decomposition of the edges in P \ G∗,
we now present a crucial structural lemma. The follow-
ing lemma identifies sufficient conditions on the local
ordering of the edge weights for two different instances
under which the outputs of the greedy matching for the
instances are non-identical.
Lemma 1. Given instances {P, C, b, (w(a, i))(a,i)∈P}
and {P, C, b, (w˜(a, i))(a,i)∈P} of the capacitated match-
ing problem, let G∗ = {g∗1 , g∗2 , . . . , g∗m} and G˜ denote
2If g = (a, i), we abuse notation and let w(g) = w(a, i).
the output of Algorithm 1 for these instances, respec-
tively. Let E1, E2 be conditions described as follows:
E1 ={∃j < j′ |(w˜(g∗j ) < w˜(g∗j′)) ∧ (g∗j′ ∈ G˜)}
E2 ={∃g∗j ∈ G∗, (a, i) ∈ LG
∗
j |
(w˜(g∗j ) < w˜(a, i)) ∧ ((a, i) ∈ G˜)}.
If G∗ 6= G˜, then at least one of E1 or E2 must be true.
Lemma 1 is fundamental in the analysis of our MG-
EUCB algorithm because it provides a method to map the
selection of each sub-optimal edge to a familiar condition
comparing empirical rewards to stationary rewards.
4 ONLINE MATCHING—BANDIT
ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a multi-armed bandit algo-
rithm for the capacitated matching problem and analyze
its regret. For concreteness, we first highlight the in-
formation and action sets available to the designer in
the online problem. The designer is presented with a
partial instance of the matching problem without the
weights, i.e., {P, C, b} along with a fixed time horizon
of n epochs but has the ability to set the parameters
(τ1, τ2, . . . , τn), where τk is the number of iterations un-
der epoch k. The designer’s goal is to design a policy α
that selects a matching α(k) in the k–th epoch that is a
feasible solution for (P1). At the end of the k–th epoch,
the designer observes the average reward rθa(k)a,i for each
(a, i) ∈ α(k) but not the agent’s type. We abuse notation
and take θa(k) to be the agent’s state at the beginning
of epoch k. The designer’s objective is to minimize the
regret over the finite horizon.
The expected regret of a policy α is the difference in
the expected aggregate reward of a benchmark match-
ing and that of the matching returned by the policy,
summed over n epochs. Owing to its favorable prop-
erties (see Section 3), we use the greedy matching on
the stationary state rewards as our benchmark. Measur-
ing the regret with respect to the unknown stationary-
distribution is standard with MDPs (e.g., see (Gai et al.,
2011; Tekin and Liu, 2010, 2012)). Formally, let
G∗ denote the output of Algorithm 1 on the instance
{P, C, b, (µa,i)(a,i)∈P}—i.e., with the weights w(a, i)
equal the stationary state rewards µa,i.
Definition 1. The expected regret of a policy α with re-
spect to the greedy matching G∗ is given by
Rα(n) = n
∑
(a,i)∈G∗
µa,i −
n∑
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈α(k)
E[rθa(k)a,i ],
where the expectation is with respect to the reward and
the state of the agents during each epoch.
4.1 REGRET DECOMPOSITION
As is usual in this type of analysis, we start by decompos-
ing the regret in terms of the number of selections of each
sub-optimal arm (edge). We state some assumptions and
define notation before proving our generic regret decom-
position theorem. A complete list of the notation used
can be found in Section A of the supplementary mate-
rial.
1. For analytic convenience, we assume that the number
of agents and incentives is balanced and therefore,
|A| = |I| = m. WLOG, every agent is matched to
some incentive in G∗; if this is not the case, we can
add dummy incentives with zero reward.
2. Suppose that G∗ = {g∗1 , g∗2 , . . . , g∗m} such that
µg∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ µg∗m and let i∗(a) denote the incen-
tive that a is matched to in G∗. Let L∗1, . . . L
∗
m be the
marginal infeasibility sets as defined in (1).
3. Suppose that τ0 ≥ 1 and τk = τ0 + ζk for some
non-negative integer ζ.
Let 1{·} be the indicator function—e.g., 1{(a, i) ∈
α(k)} is one when the edge (a, i) belongs to the match-
ing α(k), and zero otherwise. Define Tαa,i(n) =∑n
k=1 1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)} to be the random variable that
denotes the number of epochs in which an edge is se-
lected under an algorithm α. By relating E[Tαa,i(n)] to
the regret Rα(n), we are able to provide bounds on the
performance of α.
By adding and subtracting
∑
(a,i)∈P E[Tαa,i(n)]µa,i from
the equation in Definition 1, we get that
Rα(n) =
∑
(a,i)∈P E[Tαa,i(n)](µa,i∗(a) − µa,i)
+
∑n
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈P E[1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}
(
µa,i − rθa(k)a,i
)
].
To further simplify the regret, we separate the edges
in P by introducing the notion of a sub-optimal edge.
Formally, for any given a ∈ A, define Sa :=
{(a, i) | µa,i∗(a) ≥ µa,i ∀i ∈ I} and S :=
⋃
a∈A Sa.
Then, the regret bound in the above equation can be sim-
plified by ignoring the contribution of the terms in P \S.
That is, since µa,i∗(a) < µa,i for all (a, i) ∈ P \ S ,
Rα(n) ≤∑(a,i)∈S E[Tαa,i(n)](µa,i∗(a) − µa,i)
+
∑n
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈P E[1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}
(
µa,i − rθa(k)a,i
)
].
(2)
Recall from the definition of the marginal infeasibility
sets in (1) that for any given (a, i) ∈ P \G∗, there exists
a unique edge g∗j ∈ G∗ such that (a, i) ∈ L∗j . Define
L−1(a, i) := g∗j ∈ G∗ such that (a, i) ∈ L∗j . Now, we
can define the reward gap for any given edge as follows:
∆a,i =

µa,i∗(a) − µa,i, if (a, i) ∈ S
µL−1(a,i) − µa,i, if (a, i) ∈ (P \G∗) \ S
µg∗j−1 − µg∗j , if (a, i) = g∗j for j ≥ 2
This leads us to our main regret decomposition result
which leverages mixing times for Markov chains (Fill,
1991) along with Equation (2) in deriving regret bounds.
For an aperiodic, irreducible Markov chain Pa,i, using
the notion that it convergences to its stationary state un-
der repeated plays of a fixed action, we can prove that for
every arm (a, i), there exists a constant Ca,i > 0 such
that
∣∣E[µa,i − rθa(k)a,i ]∣∣ ≤ Ca,i/τk—in fact, this result
holds for all type distributions β(k)a of the agent.
Proposition 1. Suppose for each (a, i) ∈ P , Pa,i is an
aperiodic, irreducible Markov chain with corresponding
constant Ca,i. Then, for a given algorithm α where τk =
τ0 + ζk for some fixed ζ > 0, we have that
Rα(n) ≤∑(a,i)∈S Eα[Tαa,i(n)](∆a,i + Ca,iτ0 )
+m
C∗
ζ
(
1 + log
(
ζ(n− 1)/τ0 + 1
))
.
The proof of this proposition is in Section B.2 of the sup-
plementary material.
4.2 MG-EUCB ALGORITHM AND ANALYSIS
In the initialization phase, the algorithm computes and
plays a sequence of matchingsM1,M2, . . . ,Mp for a to-
tal of p epochs. The initial matchings ensure that ev-
ery edge in P is selected at least once—the computa-
tion of these initial matchings relies on a greedy cov-
ering algorithm that is described in Section C.1 of the
supplementary material. Following this, our algorithm
maintains the cumulative empirical reward r¯a,i for ev-
ery (a, i) ∈ P . At the beginning of (say) epoch k, the
algorithm computes a greedy matching for the instance
{P, C, b, (w(a, i))(a,i)∈P} where w(a, i) = r¯a,i/Ta,i +
ca,i, i.e., the average empirical reward for the edge added
to a suitably chosen confidence window. The INCENT(·)
function (Algorithm 4, described in the supplementary
material since it is a trivial function) plays each edge in
the greedy matching for τk iterations, where τk increases
linearly with k. This process is repeated for n−p epochs.
Prior to theoretically analyzing MG-EUCB, we return to
Example 1 in order to provide intuition for how the algo-
rithm overcomes correlated convergence of rewards.
Revisiting Example 1: Why does MG-EUCB work? In
Example 1, the algorithm initially estimates the empiri-
cal reward of (a1, ii) and (a2, i2) to be zero respectively.
However, during the UCB exploration phase, the match-
ing M1 = (a1, i1), (a2, i2) is played again for epoch
length > 1 and the state of agent a1 moves from θ1 to
θ2 during the epoch. Therefore, the algorithm estimates
the average reward of each edge within the epoch to be
≥ 0.5, and the empirical reward increases. This contin-
ues as the epoch length increases, so that eventually the
Algorithm 2 MatchGreedy-EpochUCB
1: procedure MG-EUCB(ζ, τ0,P)
2: t1 ← 0, r¯a,i ← 0 & Ta,i ← 1 ∀(a, i) ∈ P
3: M1,M2, . . . ,Mp ⊂ P s.t. (a, i) ∈ Mj ⇔ (a, i) /∈
M` ∀` 6= j . see Supplement C.1 for details
4: INCENT(·) . see Alg. 4 in Supplement C
5: for1 ≤ n ≤ m . play each arm once
6: (r¯a,i)(a,i)∈Mn ← INCENT(Mn, tn, n, τ0, ζ)
7: tn+1 ← tn + τ0 + ζn
8: end for
9: while n > m
10: MG = MG((r¯a,i/Ta,i + c
Ta,i
a,i (n))(a,i)∈P )
11: (ra,i(tn))(a,i)∈MG ← INCENT(MG, tn, n, τ0, ζ)
12: r¯a,i ← r¯a,i + 1τ0+ζnra,i(tn) ∀(a, i) ∈MG
13: Ta,i ← Ta,i + 1 ∀(a, i) ∈MG
14: tn+1 ← tn + τ0 + ζn; n← n+ 1
15: end while
16: end procedure
empirical reward for (a1, i1) exceeds that of (a1, i2) and
the algorithm correctly identifies the optimal matching as
we move from exploration to exploitation.
In order to characterize the regret of the MG-EUCB algo-
rithm, Proposition 1 implies that it is sufficient to bound
the expected number of epochs in which our algorithm
selects each sub-optimal edge. The following theorem
presents an upper bound on this quantity.
Theorem 2. Consider a finite set of m agents A and
incentives I with corresponding aperiodic, irreducible
Markov chains Pa,i for each (a, i) ∈ P . Let α be the
MG-EUCB algorithm with mixing time sequence {τk}
where τk = τ0 + ζk, τ0 > 0, and ζ > 0. Then for every
(a, i) ∈ S,
Eα[Ta,i(n)] ≤ 4m2∆2
a∗,i∗
(
ρa∗,i∗√
τ0
+
√
6 log n+ 4 logm
)2
+ 2(1 + log(n))
where (a∗, i∗) = argmax(a1,i1)∈P\g∗1
⌈
4
∆2a1,i1
(ρa1,i1√
τ0
+
√
6 log n+ 4 logm
)2⌉
, and ρa,i is a constant specific to
edge (a, i).
The full proof of the theorem is provided can be found in
the supplementary material.
Proof (sketch.) There are three key ingredients to the
proof: (i) linearly increasing epoch lengths, (ii) overcom-
ing cascading errors, and (iii) application of the Azuma-
Hoeffding concentration inequality.
By increasing the epoch length linearly, MG-EUCB en-
sures that as the algorithm converges to the optimal
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Figure 2: Synthetic Experiments: Comparison of MG-EUCB(+) and H-EUCB(+) to their respective offline solutions (G- and H-
optimal, respectively) and to C-UCB (classical UCB). We use the following set up: (i) |A| = |I| = |Θa| = 10 (see Supplement D
for more extensive experiments) (ii) each state transition matrix Pa,i associated with an arm (a, i) ∈ P was selected uniformly
at random within the class of aperiodic and irreducible stochastic matrices; (iii) the reward for each arm, state pair rθa,i is drawn
i.i.d. from a distribution Tr(a, i, θ) belonging to either a Bernoulli, Uniform, or Beta distribution; (iv) τ0 = 50 and ζ = 1.
matching, it also plays each arm for a longer duration
within an epoch. This helps the algorithm to progres-
sively discard sub-optimal arms without selecting them
too many times when the epoch length is still small. At
the same time, the epoch length is long enough to al-
low for sufficient mixing and separation between multi-
ple near-optimal matchings. If we fix the epoch length
as a constant, the resulting regret bounds are consider-
ably worse because the agent states may never converge
to the steady-state distributions.
To address cascading errors, we provide a useful charac-
terization. For a given (a, i), suppose that uka,i(t) refers
to the average empirical reward obtained from edge (a, i)
up to epoch t−1 plus the upper confidence bound param-
eter, given that edge (a, i) has been selected for exactly
k times in epochs 1 to t − 1 . For any given epoch k
where the algorithm selects a sub-optimal matching, i.e.,
α(k) 6= G∗, we can apply Lemma 1 and get that at least
one of the following conditions must be true:
1. 1{∃j < j′| (ukg∗
j′
(t) > ukg∗j (t)
) ∧ (g∗j′ ∈ α(t))}
2. 1{∃j, (a, i) ∈ L∗j |
(
ukg∗j (t) < u
k
a,i(t)
) ∨ ((a, i) ∈
α(k))} = 1
This is a particularly useful characterization because it
maps the selection of each sub-optimal edge to a familiar
condition that compares the empirical rewards to the sta-
tionary rewards. Therefore, once each arm is selected for
O(log(n)) epochs, the empirical rewards approach the
‘true’ rewards and our algorithm discards sub-optimal
edges. Mathematically, this can be written as
Eα[Ta′,i′(n)] = 1 +
∑n
t=p+1 1{(a′, i′) ∈ α(t)}
≤ `m2 +∑mj=1∑(a,i)∈L+j ∑nt=p+1∑t−1s=1∑t−1k=` (
1{usg∗j (t) ≤ uka,i(t)}
)
,
where ` is some carefully chosen constant, L+j = L
∗
j ∪
{g∗j+1} and L+m = L∗m.
With this characterization, for each s, we find an upper
bound on the probability of the event {usg∗j (t) ≤ uka,i(t)}.
However, this is a non-trivial task since the reward ob-
tained in any given epoch is not independent of the
previous actions. Specifically, the underlying Markov
process that generates the rewards is common across
the edges connected to any given agent in the sense,
that the initial distribution for each Markov chain
that results from pulling an edge is the distribution at
the end of the preceding pull. Therefore, we employ
Azuma-Hoeffding (Azuma, 1967; Hoeffding, 1963), a
concentration inequality that does not require indepen-
dence in the arm-based observed rewards. Moreover,
unlike the classical UCB analysis, the empirical reward
can differ from the expected stationary reward due to
the distributions Tr(a, i, θ) and βka,i 6= pia,i. To account
for this additional error term, we use bounds on the
convergence rates of Markov chains to guide the choice
of the confidence parameter cka,i(t) in Algorithm 2.
Applying the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality, we can show
that with high probability, the difference between the
empirical reward and the stationary reward of edge (a, i)
is no larger than cka,i(t).
As a direct consequence of Proposition 1 and Theorem 2,
we get that for a fixed instance, the regret only increases
logarithmically with n.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present a set of illustrative experi-
ments with our algorithm (MG-EUCB) on synthetic and
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Figure 3: Bike-share Experiments: Figures 3a and 3b compare the efficiency (percentage of demand satisfied) of the bike-share
system with two demand models under incentive matchings selected by MG-EUCB+ with upper and lower bounds given by the
system performance when the incentives are computed via the benchmark greedy matching that uses the state information and when
no incentives are offered respectively. In Figure 3c we plot the mean reward of the MG-EUCB+ algorithm with static and random
demand which gives the expected number of agents who accept an incentive within each epoch.
real data. We observe much faster convergence with
the greedy matching as compared to the Hungarian al-
gorithm. Moreover, as is typical in the bandit literature
(e.g., (Auer et al., 2002)), we show that a tuned version
of our algorithm (MG-EUCB+), in which we reduce the
coefficient on the log(n) term in the UCB ‘confidence
parameter’ from six to three, further improves the con-
vergence of our algorithm. Finally we show that our al-
gorithm can be effectively used as an incentive design
scheme to improve the performance of a bike-share sys-
tem.
5.1 SYNTHETIC EXPERIMENTS
We first highlight the failure of classical UCB ap-
proaches (C-UCB)—e.g., as in (Gai et al., 2011)—for
problems with correlated reward evolution. In Figure 2a,
we demonstrate that C-UCB converges almost imme-
diately to a suboptimal solution, while this is not the
case for our algorithm (MG-EUCB+). In Figure 2b,
we compare MG-EUCB and MG-EUCB+ with a vari-
ant of Algorithm 2 that uses the Hungarian method (H-
EUCB) for matchings. While H-EUCB does have a
‘marginally’ higher mean reward, Figure 2c reveals that
the MG-EUCB and MG-EUCB+ algorithms converge
much faster to the optimum solution of the greedy match-
ing than the Hungarian alternatives.
5.2 BIKE-SHARE EXPERIMENTS
In this problem, we seek to incentivize participants in
a bike-sharing system; our goal is to alter their intended
destination in order to balance the spatial supply of avail-
able bikes appropriately and meet future user demand.
We use data from the Boston-based bike-sharing service
Hubway (hub) to construct the example. Formally, we
consider matching each agent a to an incentive i = s′a,
meaning the algorithm proposes that agent a travel to
station s′a as opposed to its intended destination sa (po-
tentially, for some monetary benefit). The agent’s state
θa controls the probability of accepting the incentive by
means of a distance threshold parameter and a parameter
of a Bernouilli distribution, both of which are drawn uni-
formly at random. More details on the data and problem
setup can be found in Section D of the supplementary
material.
Our bike-share simulations presented in Figure 3 show
approximately a 40% improvement in system perfor-
mance when compared to an environment without incen-
tives and convergence towards an upper bound on system
performance. Moreover, our algorithm achieves this sig-
nificant performance increase while on average matching
less than 1% of users in the system to an incentive.
6 Conclusion
We combine ideas from greedy matching, the UCB
multi-armed bandit strategy, and the theory of Markov
chain mixing times to propose a bandit algorithm for
matching incentives to users, whose preferences are un-
known a priori and evolving dynamically in time, in a
resource constrained environment. For this algorithm,
we derive logarithmic gap-dependent regret bounds de-
spite the additional technical challenges of cascading
sub-optimality and correlated convergence. Finally, we
demonstrate the empirical performance via examples.
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A NOTATIONAL TABLE
notation meaning
A set of agents
I set of incentives
P = A× I allowed agent-incentive pairs
Θa state (type) space of agent a
Pa,i transition probability kernel
β
(t)
a agent a’s type distribution at epoch t
pia,i stationary distribution of (a, i) ∈ P
µa,i expected reward from (a, i) ∈ P
τk
number of iterations matching offered
in epoch k, τk = τ0 + ζk, ζ > 0
rθaa,i random reward
Tr(a, i, θa) agent a’s reward distribution
rθa,i
time-averaged reward during epoch k
r
θa(k)
a,i =
1
τk
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
r
θa(t)
a,i
bξl maximum number of edges of class ξl
G∗ greedy matching on weights (µa,i)
g∗j
the edge having the j–th
largest weight (µa,i) in G∗.
i∗(a) incentive agent a is matched to in G∗
L∗j
set of (a, i) ∈ P that become infeasi-
ble when g∗j is added to matching
but not before that
Sa
set of edges (a, i) such that
µa,i ≤ µa,i∗(a)
S ⋃a∈A Sa
m number of agents & incentives
n the total number of epochs
θa(t)
state of agent a at the beginning
of epoch t
Ca,i, ρa,i constants specific to each edge (a, i)
C∗ max(a,i)∈P\S Ca,i
Rα(n)
regret of given matching policy
α at the end of n epochs
Ta,i(n)
number of times edge (a, i)
selected in first n epochs
Rθ,ka,j
reward on edge (a, i) when selected
for the k–th time given θa
R¯ka,j
average reward on first k times (a, i)
is selected, i.e., 1k
∑k
i=1R
θ,k
a,j
θa(t
l
a,i)
agent a’s state at the beginning
of epoch l
Xka,i R
θ,k
a,i − E[Rθ,ka,i |Fk−1a,i ]
Y ka,i
∑k
j=1X
j
a,i a martingale
Qa,i(k)
Ca,i
2
(
1
ζ+τ0
+ 1ζ log
(
1 + kζτ0
))
cka,j(t)
upper confidence parameter for edge
(a, j) after being selected for k times
uka,j(t)
average reward plus upper confidence
parameter for (a, j), i.e., R¯ka,j + c
k
a,j
B PROOFS
B.1 PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof Our proof relies on what is referred to in the
matching literature as a charging argument. In sim-
ple terms, we take each edge belonging to the bench-
markM∗ and identify a corresponding edge inG∗ whose
weight is larger than that of the benchmark edge. This
allows us to charge the weight of the original edge to an
edge in G∗. During the charging process, we ensure that
no more than three edges inM∗ are charged to each edge
in G∗. This gives us an approximation factor of three.
Suppose that an edge (a, i) belongs to M∗ but not G∗.
This implies that the edge (a, i) was removed from the
setE′ at some iteration during the course of Algorithm 1.
Moreover, as per the algorithm, this removal can happen
in one of two ways: (i) via Line 7, in which case there
exists some edge (a, i′) or (a′, i) that was selected to G∗
ahead of (a, i), and (ii) via Line 8 in which case bξj edges
belonging to class ξj = c(a, i) were added to G∗ before
(a, i), as a result of which the capacity constraint for that
class was met. Based on this, we divide the analysis into
two cases.
Case I: Removal via Line 7. Without loss of generality,
suppose that (a′, i) is the edge added to G∗ during the
iteration in which (a, i) is removed. Then, by definition,
since (a′, i) = arg max(a′′,i′′)∈E′ w(a′′, i′′) before the
removal of (a, i) from E′, we infer that
w(a, i) ≤ w(a′, i) (3)
Case II: Removal via Line 8. In this case, since the class
ξj = c(a, i) has reached its capacity limit, and since the
greedy algorithm selects edges in the decreasing order
of weight, it must be the case that for every (a′, i′) ∈
G∗ ∩ ξj , we have that
w(a, i) ≤ w(a′, i′).
Since G∗ ∩ ξj contains exactly bξj , we can average the
above equation over the edges in G∗ ∩ ξj to get that
w(a, i) ≤ 1bξj
∑
(a′,i′)∈G∗∩ξj w(a
′, i′). (4)
Finally, we note that if edge (a, i) belongs to both the
greedy matching and M∗, we can simply ‘charge the
weight of (a, i)’ to itself.
Now we can complete the proof by summing (3) and (4)
over all the edges in M∗. Formally, let M∗ = M∗1 ∪M∗2
such that M∗1 denotes the set of edges that are present
in both M∗ and G∗ as well as the edges that fall under
the first case. Similarly, let M∗2 denote the edges that fall
under the second case. Summing 3 over all of the edges
in M∗1 , we get that∑
(a,i)∈M∗1 w(a, i) ≤ 2
∑
(a,i)∈G∗ w(a, i). (5)
The factor of two in the right hand side comes from the
fact that for any given edge (a, i) in G∗, at most two
edges in M∗1 can be charged to this edge. Indeed, the
only edges that can be charged to (a, i) must contain ei-
ther the node a or the node i and in a matching, each
node can appear in at most one edge. Next, summing (4)
over all of the edges in M∗2 , we get that∑
(a,i)∈M∗2 w(a, i) =
∑
ξj∈C
∑
(a,i)∈M∗2∩ξj w(a, i)
≤∑ξj∈C∑(a,i)∈ξj∩G∗ w(a, i)
=
∑
(a,i)∈G∗ w(a, i). (6)
To see why this is the case, first observe that in (4), for
each edge in class ξj belonging to M∗2 , all of the edges
in class ξj in matching G∗ appear in the right hand side
with coefficient 1bξj
. By definition,there are at most bξj
edges of class ξj inM∗ and exactly bξj edges of this class
belong to G∗—if this were not the case, Line 8 of Algo-
rithm 1 would not be used. To conclude, the coefficient
for each edge in the right hand side is increased by 1bξj
for every edge in M∗2 ∩ ξj , and summing over all edges,
we get a coefficient of one, therefore validating (6).
Summing (5) and (6), concludes the proof.
B.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Properties of Markov Chains Before decomposing
the regret, we briefly digress to recall some classic results
on mixing of Markov chains. For an ergoidic (i.e. irre-
ducible and aperiodic) transition matrix on a finite state
space Θ, let pi be its stationary distribution and P˜ denote
the time reversal of its transition matrix P—that is,
P˜ (θ, θ′) =
pi(θ′)P (θ′, θ)
pi(θ)
.
The time reversal kernel P˜ is also ergodic with stationary
distribution pi. Define the multiplicative reversiblization
M(P ) of P by M(P ) = PP˜ which is a reversible tran-
sition matrix itself. The eigenvalues of M(P ) are real
and non-negative so that the second largest eigenvalue
λ1(M) ∈ [0, 1] (Fill, 1991). Define chi-squared distance
from stationary at time n by
χ2n =
∑
θ
(pin(θ)− pi(θ))2
pi(θ)
.
where pin =
∑
θ pi0(θ)P
n(θ, ·).
Proposition 2 ((Fill, 1991)). Let P be an er-
godic transition matrix on a finite state space Θ
and let pi be the stationary distribution. Then
4‖pin − pi‖2 ≤
(
λ1(M)
)n
χ20. Furthermore,
maxpi0∈P(Θ)
∥∥∑
θ P
n(θ, ·)pi0(θ) − pi(·)
∥∥2 ≤
1
4
(1−minθ pi(θ))2
minθ pi(θ)
(
λ1(M)
)n
.
where P(Θ) us the space of probability distributions on
Θ3.
From the perspective of a general epoch mixing policy
α, the above proposition provides a bound on how close
the distribution on types for the Markov chain is after τk
time steps has elapsed when edge (a, i) is chosen.
Lemma 2. Consider an arbitrary epoch mixing policy α
that selects a matching α(k) during the k–th epoch for
τk iterations. For each arm (a, i) ∈ α(k), there exists a
constant Ca,i > 0 such that∣∣E[µa,i − rθa(k)a,i ]∣∣ ≤ Ca,iτk (7)
The proof is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.
Proof Noting that µj =
∑
θ r
j
θpi
j(θ), a direct applica-
tion of Proposition 2 gives us the following:∣∣∣E [∑θ rjθpij(θ)− 1τk ∑tk+1−1t=tk rjθ,t∣∣∣θtk]∣∣∣
≤ 1τk
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
∑
θ
∣∣(pij(θ)− βt(θ))∣∣
≤ 1τk
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
∑
θ
∣∣(pij(θ)−∑θ′ P t−tkj (θ′, θ)βtk(θ′))∣∣
= 1τk
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
‖pij(·)−∑θ′ P t−tkj (θ′, ·)βtk(θ′)‖1
≤ 1τk
∑tk+1−1
t=tk
Cjλ
t−tk
j =
Cj(1−λτkj )
τk(1−λj)
This is simply because of the fact that the expected re-
ward is less than 1 by construction, the triangle inequal-
ity, and Fubini’s theorem (Folland, 2007, Theorem 2.37).
We also remark that Proposition 2 also implies that this
bound holds for all β(k)a (i.e. the distribution of agent a’s
type at the beginning of epoch k) and hence, is indepen-
dent of the algorithm α.
Proof [Proposition 1] Consider the expression for regret
from Definition 1:
Rα(n) = n
∑
g∗j∈G∗ µg
∗
j
−∑nk=1∑(a,i)∈α(k) E[rθa,i],
3We remark that the bound in the above equation is eas-
ily computed by noting that χ2n is always bounded above by
(minθ pi(θ))
−1(1−minθ pi(θ))2.
By adding and subtracting
∑
(a,i)∈P T
α
a,i(n)µa,i from
the above equation, the cumulative regret can be written
as:
Rα(n) = n
∑
a∈A
µa,i∗(a) −
∑
(a,i)∈P
Tαa,i(n)µa,i
+
∑
(a,i)∈P
Tαa,i(n)µa,i −
n∑
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈α(k)
r
θa(k)
a,i
=
∑
(a,i)∈P
Tαa,i(n)µa,i∗(a) −
∑
(a,i)∈P
Tαa,i(n)µa,i
+
∑
(a,i)∈P
Tαa,i(n)µa,i
−
n∑
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈P
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}rθa(k)a,i
=
∑
(a,i)∈P
Tαa,i(n)(µa,i∗(a) − µa,i)
+
n∑
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈P
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}(µa,i − rθa(k)a,i )
(8)
where 1(·) is the indicator function—e.g., 1{(a, i) ∈
α(k)} is one when the edge (a, i) belongs to the match-
ing α(k). In the term
∑
(a,i)∈P T
α
a,i(n)µa,i∗(a), µa,i∗(a)
appears exactly n times. Although one would expect
the matching chosen by the policy (at least in the ini-
tial stages) to be sub-optimal compared to the benchmark
greedy matching, it is highly possible that some indi-
vidual edges (arms) may outperform those in the greedy
matching. To account for this, we separate the edges in
P into the sub-optimal edges and the super-optimal ones.
Formally, for any given a ∈ A, define the set of sub-
optimal edges Sa as follows:
Sa = {(a, i) | µa,i∗(a) ≥ µa,i ∀i ∈ I}.
Suppose that S = ⋃a∈A Sa. Then, the regret bound in
Equation (8) can be simplified by ignoring the contribu-
tion of the terms in P \ S . That is, since µa,i∗(a) < µa,i
for all (a, i) ∈ P \ S , we have that:
Rα(n) ≤
∑
(a,i)∈S
Tαa,i(n)(µa,i∗(a) − µa,i)
+
n∑
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈P
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}(µa,i − rθa(k)a,i ).
(9)
Next, we separate the second term above into the con-
tribution of the edges in S and those in P \ S. That is,
∑n
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈P 1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}
(
µa,i− rθa(k)a,i
)
can be
written as:
n∑
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈S
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}(µa,i − rθa(k)a,i )
+
n∑
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈P\S
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}(µa,i − rθa(k)a,i )
(10)
We can now use Lemma 2 to bound the difference be-
tween the empirical rewards and the stationary reward
during any given epoch. Suppose that τ0 ≥ 1 and
τk = τ0 + ζk with ζ a non-zero natural number4. An ap-
plication of Lemma 2 and the tower property of expecta-
tion allows us to bound the first term above, i.e., suppose
that T1 = E
[∑n
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈S 1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}
(
µa,i −
r
θa(k)
a,i
)]
. Then,
T1 = Eα
[ n∑
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈S
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}E[
µa,i − rθa(k)a,i
∣∣θa(k)]]
≤ Eα
[ n∑
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈S
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}Ca,i
τk
]
≤ Eα
[ ∑
(a,i)∈S
n∑
k=1
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}Ca,i
τ0
]
≤
∑
(a,i)∈S
Ca,i
τ0
Eα[Tαj (n)] (11)
where we use the notation Eα to emphasize that
this expectation is now dependent only on the
algorithm where the number of times an arm
is chosen is a random variable. Analogously,
bound the second term of Equation 10, i.e., T2 =
E
[∑n
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈P\S 1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}
(
µa,i − rθa(k)a,i
)]
T2 ≤ Eα
[ n∑
k=1
∑
(a,i)∈P\S
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}Ca,i
τk
]
≤
n∑
k=1
1
τk
∑
(a,i)∈P\S
Ca,iEα
[
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}]
≤ C∗
n∑
k=1
1
τk
∑
(a,i)∈P
Eα
[
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}]
≤ mC∗
n∑
k=1
1
τk
,
4There are other choices for the sequence {τk}; e.g., τk =
akτ0. The choice we make allows for tighter bounds.
where C∗ = max(a,i)∈P\S Ca,i. Note that for any given
epoch k, our policy selects at mostm edges in the match-
ing and therefore,
∑
(a,i)∈P\L Eα
[
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}] ≤∑
(a,i)∈P Eα
[
1{(a, i) ∈ α(k)}] ≤ m. Finally, we
can bound the harmonic summation using the fact that
τk = τ0 + ζk:
T2 ≤ mC∗
n∑
k=1
1
τk
≤ mC∗ 1
ζ
(
1 +
∫ n−1+τ0/ζ
τ0/ζ
1
x
dx
)
≤ mC∗ 1
ζ
(
1 + log
(n− 1
τ0
+ 1
))
(12)
Recall from the definition of the marginal infeasibility
sets in Equation (1) that for any given (a, i) ∈ P \ G∗,
there exists a unique edge g∗j ∈ G∗ such that (a, i) ∈ L∗j .
Define L−1(a, i) := g∗j ∈ G∗ such that (a, i) ∈ L∗j .
Now, we can define the reward gap for any given edge
(a, i) ∈ P as follows:
∆a,i = µa,i∗(a) − µa,i if (a, i) ∈ S
= µL−1(a,i) − µa,i if (a, i) ∈ (P \G∗) \ S
= µg∗j−1 − µg∗j if (a, i) = g∗j for j ≥ 2.
Going back to our regret lower bound in (9) and decom-
posing the second term using (11) and (12), we get the
main proposition.
B.3 PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Before proving Theorem 2, we state some useful supple-
mentary lemmas.
Lemma 3 (Azuma-Hoeffding Inequality (Azuma, 1967;
Hoeffding, 1963)). Suppose (Zk)k∈Z+ is a martingale
with respect to the filtration (Fk)k∈Z+ having bounded
differences, i.e., there are finite, non-negative constants
ck, k ≥ 1 such that |Zk − Zk−1| < ck almost surely.
Then for all t > 0
P (Zk − EZk ≤ −t) ≤ exp
(
− t
2
2
∑N
k=1(c
k)2
)
.
We define some notation that is useful for the follow-
ing lemma as well the proof of Theorem 2. Consider
the MG-EUCB algorithm described in Algorithm 2. Let
Rθ,ja,i be the cumulative reward received when arm (a, i)
is chosen for the j–th time where we include θ in the
subscript to note the state-dependence of the random re-
ward. That is, Rθ,ja,i = r
θa(t
j
a,i)
a,i where, by an abuse of no-
tation, tja,i denotes the time instance at which edge (a, i)
is pulled for the j–th time and θa(t
j
a,i) denotes the state
of agent a during that epoch.
Define the filtration Fka,i =
σ(Rθ,1a,i , . . . , R
θ,k
a,i , θa(t
j
1), . . . , θa(t
j
k))—that is, the
smallest σ-algebra generated by the random vari-
ables (Rθ,1a,i , . . . , R
θ,k
a,i , θa(t
1
a,i), . . . , θa(t
k
a,i)). Let
Xka,i = R
θ,k
a,i − E[Rθ,ka,i |Fk−1a,i ] and Y ka,i =
∑k
j=1X
j
a,i.
We have that Y ka,i is a martingale since E[Y
k+1
a,i |Fka,i] =
E[Xk+1a,i |Fka,i] + E[Y ka,i|Fka,i] = Y ka,i (since Y ka,i is
Fka,i–measurable by construction) and E[|Y ka,i|] < ∞
(rewards are bounded). Moreover, the boundedness of
the rewards also implies the martingale Y ka,i has bounded
differences. Indeed, |Y ka,i − Y k−1a,i | = |Xka,i| ≤ 1 almost
surely since rewards are normalized to be on the interval
[0, 1], without loss of generality. Now, we are ready to
show an upper bound on the difference in the empirical
reward and the stationary state rewards.
Lemma 4. Given aperiodic, irreducible Markov chains
Pa,i with corresponding stationary distributions µa,i for
each (a, i) ∈ P and mixing sequence {τk} such that
τk = τ0 + ζk, τ0 ≥ 1, we have that∣∣∣E [µa,i − 1k∑kj=1 E[Rθ,ja,i |F j−1a,i ]]∣∣∣
≤ Ca,i2k
(
1
ζ+τ0
+ 1ζ log
(
1 + kζτ0
))
(13)
The proof of the above lemma follows a similar line of
reasoning as Lemma 2.
Proof Since Θ is a finite set with finite elements
(i.e. |x| < ∞ for all x ∈ Θ), we are able to use
analogous reasoning as was used in Proposition 2 along
with the Markov property on the conditional expecta-
tion E[Rji |F ji−1] to bound µj − 1k
∑k
i=1 E[R
j
i |F ji−1] by
Lj(k)
k for some constant Lj(k). Indeed, the quantity
V =
∣∣∣E[µj − 1k∑ki=1 E[Rji |F ji−1]]∣∣∣ can be simplified
as follows:
V =
∣∣∣ 1k∑ki=1 (E [µj − E[Rji |F ji−1]])∣∣∣
≤ 1k
∑k
i=1 E
[∑
θ r
j
θpi
j(θ)−
E
[
(τ ji )
−1
tji+1−1∑
t=tji
rjθ,t
∣∣∣F ji−1]]
≤ 1k
∑k
i=1 E
[
(τ ji )
−1∑tji+1−1
t=tji
∑
θ |pij(θ)− βt(θ)|
]
≤ 1k
∑k
i=1
Cj
2 E
[
(τ ji )
−1∑tji+1−1
t=tji
(λj)
(t−tji )
]
≤ 1k
∑k
i=1
Cj
2 E
[
(τ ji )
−1(1− (λj)τji )(1− λj)−1
]
≤ 1k Cj2 11−λj
∑k
i=1 E
[
(τ ji )
−1],
where we have used the fact that the reward bounded al-
most surely on [0, 1]. Now, 1/τij is a random variable
with respect to the algorithm since at the i–th pull of arm
j we do not know a priori what iteration of the algo-
rithm we are on. However, at the i–th pull of arm, we
do know that the algorithm is at least at the i–th iter-
ation. Hence,
∑k
i=1 E
[
(τ ji )
−1] ≤ ∑ki=1(τ0 + ζi)−1.
Now, for any a ≥ 1 and positive integer k, we have
that
∑a+k
i=a (i)
−1 ≤ 1a + log(1 + ka ). Indeed, rewrite
the summation in the lemma statement as
∑a+k
i=a i
−1 =
a−1+
∑a+k
i=a+1 i
−1 and apply the fundamental inequality,
(i)−1 ≤ ∫ i
i−1 x
−1dx, which holds for any i ≥ 1, repeat-
edly for i = a + 1, a + 2, . . . , a + k so that we have a
telescoping summation of integrals—i.e.∑a+k
i=a
1
i =
1
a +
∑a+k
i=a+1
1
i
≤ 1
a
+
∫ a+k
a
1
x
dx =
1
a
+ log
(
a+ k
a
)
.
Thus,
∑k
i=1(τ0 + ζi)
−1 ≤ (ζ + τ0)−1 + 1ζ log
(
1 + kζτ0
)
so that (13) holds.
Proof [Theorem 2] We begin by formalizing the choice
of the UCB parameter cka,i(t)—it is crucial that this pa-
rameter reflects the error due to both the Markov chain
and the randomness of rewards. Applying Lemma 4 to
our problem, we observe that the average error stemming
from the randomness in the user state after k pulls of the
edge (a, i) can be written as:∣∣∣E [µa,i − 1k∑kj=1 E[Rθ,ja,i |F j−1a,i ]]∣∣∣
≤ Ca,i2k
(
1
ζ+τ0
+ 1ζ log
(
1 + kζτ0
))
Based on this, for each edge (a, i) and ‘pull count’ k, we
define the constant Qa,i(k)
Qa,i(k) =
Ca,i
2
(
1
ζ + τ0
+
1
ζ
log
(
1 +
kζ
τ0
))
.
Finally, we can now define the confidence parameter as
follows:
cka,i(t) = Qa,i(k)/k +
√
6
k
log(t) +
4
k
log(m).
Coming back to the proof of Theorem 2, our primary
goal is to map every selection of a sub-optimal edge to
a condition on the relative empirical rewards between
edges that can then be resolved using Azuma-Hoeffding
inequality. Applying Lemma 1, we see that if MATCH-
GREEDY does not return the benchmark matching G∗
at epoch t and instead returns a matching α(t) 6= G∗, at
least one of the above conditions must fail. Alternatively,
this implies that one of the following two (inverse) con-
ditions must be true:
1. 1{∃j < j′| (ug∗
j′
(t) > ug∗j (t)
) ∧ (g∗j′ ∈ α(t))}
2. 1{∃j, (a, i) ∈ L∗j |
(
ug∗j (t) < ua,i(t)
) ∨ ((a, i) ∈
α(t))} = 1
To express the above conditions in a concise manner, let
us augment the sets L∗j to include edges from the greedy
matching. Specifically, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1, let L+j =
L∗j ∪ {g∗j+1} and L+m = L∗m. Observe that
⋃
j L
+
j =
P \ g∗1 . Now, we can formally say that if the matching
returned by the UCB algorithm during iteration t (call
this matching α(t)) does not coincide with the greedy
matching, then
1{∃1 ≤ j ≤ m, (a, i) ∈ L+j | ug∗j (t)
< ua,i(t) ∧ (a, i) ∈ α(t)} = 1. (14)
We will use the notation R¯ka,i =
1
k
∑k
j=1R
θ,j
a,i . Since
Proposition 1 provides an upper bound for the regret in
terms of the number of times each (sub-optimal) edge
is chosen, it suffices to bound the quantity Ta′,i′(n),
which is the number of times our UCB algorithm selects
the edge (a′, i′) given that (a′, i′) ∈ S—i.e. µa′,i′ <
µa′,i∗(a′). Note that by definition, for any (a, i) ∈ S , the
edge (a′, i′) does not belong to the greedy benchmark
matchingG∗. Suppose that ` denotes an arbitrary integer
(to be formalized later). Then, we have that:
Ta′,i′(n) = 1 +
∑n
t=m+1 1{(a′, i′) ∈ α(t)}
≤ 1 +∑nt=m+1 1{∃j, (a, i) ∈ L+j | ug∗j (t)
< ua,i(t) ∧ (a, i) ∈ α(t)} (from (14))
≤ 1 +∑nt=m+1∑mj=1∑(a,i)∈L+j 1{ug∗j (t) ≤
ua,i(t) ∧ (a, i) ∈ α(t)}
= 1 +
∑m
j=1
∑
(a,i)∈L+j
∑n
t=m+1 1{ug∗j (t)
≤ ua,i(t) ∧ (a, i) ∈ α(t)}
≤ 1 +∑mj=1∑(a,i)∈L+j (`
+
∑n
t=m+1 1{ug∗j (t) ≤ ua,i(t)
∧ (a, i) ∈ α(t) ∧ Ta,i(t) > `}
)
≤ 1 +∑mj=1∑(a,i)∈L+j (`
+
∑n
t=m+1 1{ug∗j (t) ≤ ua,i(t)
∧ Ta,i(t) > `}
)
≤ `m2 +∑mj=1∑(a,i)∈L+j ∑nt=m+1 1{ug∗j (t)
≤ ua,i(t) ∧ Ta,i(t) > `}
≤ `m2 +∑mj=1∑(a,i)∈L+j ∑nt=m+1 (
1{min0<s<t usg∗j (t) ≤ max`≤k<t uka,i(t)}
)
≤ `m2 +∑mj=1∑(a,i)∈L+j (∑n
t=m+1
∑t−1
s=1
∑t−1
k=` 1{usg∗j (t) ≤ uka,i(t)}
)
= `m2 +
∑m
j=1
∑
(a,i)∈L+j
∑n
t=m+1
∑t−1
s=1
(
∑t−1
k=` 1{R¯sg∗j + csg∗j (t) ≤ R¯ka,i + cka,i(t)}
)
Now, R¯sg∗j + c
s
g∗j
(t) ≤ R¯ka,i + cka,i(t) implies that atleast
one of the following must hold:
R¯sg∗j ≤ µg∗j − c
s
g∗j
(t) (15)
R¯ka,i ≥ µa,i + cka,i(t) (16)
µg∗j < µa,i + 2c
k
a,i(t) (17)
Indeed, suppose that all three of the above inequalities
are false. Then, usg∗j (t) = R¯
s
g∗j
+ csg∗j (t) > µg
∗
j
≥ µa,i +
2cka,i(t) > R¯
k
a,i + c
k
a,i(t) = u
k
a,i(t), which is, of course,
a contradiction. Hence, if R¯sg∗j + c
s
g∗j
(t) ≤ R¯ka,i + cka,i(t),
then at least one of (15)–(17) holds. We bound the proba-
bility of events (15) and (16) using the Azuma-Hoeffding
inequality in Lemma 3 and find an ` such that (17) is al-
ways false for every j, (a, i) ∈ L+j .
Towards this end, we apply Lemma 3 to the martingale
(Y ka,i)k∈Z+ . Note that by the law of conditional ex-
pectations, E[Y ka,i] = 0 so that Lemma 3 implies that
for each arm (a, i) and any t > 0, P (Y ka,i ≤ −t) ≤
exp(−t2/(2k)).
We need to relate the random variable Y ka,i to the dif-
ference of the empirical mean of the average cumulative
reward from its true value for each arm so that we can
bound this difference. Consider the event
ω =
{
µg∗j − R¯sg∗j ≥ γ
}
=
{
µg∗j − 1s
∑s
l=1 E[R
θ,l
g∗j
|F l−1g∗j ]
+ 1s
∑s
l=1 E[R
θ,l
g∗j
|F l−1g∗j ]− R¯
s
g∗j
≥ γ}
=
{
µg∗j − 1s
∑s
l=1 E[R
θ,l
g∗j
|F l−1g∗j ]−
1
sY
s
g∗j
≥ γ}
where we have added and subtracted the random variable
1
s
∑s
l=1 E[R
θ,l
g∗j
|F l−1g∗j ]. By Lemma 4,
ω ⊂ { 1sQg∗j (s)− 1sY sg∗j ≥ γ}
=
{
1
sY
s
g∗j
≤ 1sQg∗j (s)− γ
}
.
Hence,
P
(
µg∗j − R¯sg∗j ≥ γ
) ≤ P(1
s
Y sg∗j ≤
1
s
Qg∗j (s)− γ
)
≤ exp (− 1
2
s
(
γ − 1
s
Qg∗j (s)
)2)
so that with γ = csg∗j (t) =
√
6
s log t+
4
s logm +
1
sQg∗j (s), we have,
P
(
µg∗j − R¯sg∗j ≥ c
s
g∗j
(t)
)
≤ t−3m−2.
Therefore, it follows that P (R¯sg∗j ≤ µg∗j − csg∗j (t)) ≤
t−3m−2 and P (R¯ka,i ≥ µa,i + cka,i(t)∗) ≤ t−3m−2
which imply that (15) and (16) occur with very low prob-
ability.
Now, we choose ` to be the largest integer such that (17)
is always false. Indeed, we choose it such that
µg∗j − µa,i − 2cka,i(t)
> µg∗j − µa,i − 2
(
Qa,i(`)
` +
√
6 log t
` +
4 logm
`
)
> 0.
Plugging in Qa,i(`), we have
∆a,i − 2
(
Ca,i
2`
(
1
ζ+τ0
+ 1ζ log
(
1 + `ζτ0
))
+
√
1
` 6 log t+
1
` 4 logm
)
> 0. (18)
Let ˜`= `ζ/τ0 so that
∆a,i − 2
(
Ca,i
2τ0
(
1
˜`
ζ
ζ+τ0
+ 1˜` log
(
1 + ˜`
))
+
√
6 log t
` +
4 logm
`
)
> 0.
Since 1/x < 1/
√
x and 1/x log(1 + x) < 1/
√
x on
[1,∞), we have that
1
˜`
ζ
ζ + τ0
+
1
˜`
log
(
1 + ˜`
)
<
ζ
ζ + τ0
1√
˜`
+
1√
˜`
so that (18) reduces to finding the largest integer ` such
that
∆a,i − 2
(
Ca,i
2τ0
(
ζ
ζ + τ0
√
τ0√
`ζ
+
√
τ0√
`ζ
)
+
√
6 log t+ 4 logm√
`
)
> 0
Rearranging and squaring terms, we get that (17) is false
for
` ≥
⌈ 4
∆2a,i
( ρa,i√
τ0
+
√
6 log n+ 4 logm
)2⌉
. (19)
In the above equation, ρa,i is the edge-specific constant
ρa,i = (
ζ
ζ + τ0
+ 1)
Ca,i
2
√
ζ
.
In fact, we require that (17) be false for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m
and (a, i) ∈ L+j . Therefore, we set the parameter ` to be
the maximum of the right hand side of (19). Formally,
define (a∗, i∗) to be the edge in P \ g∗1 that maximizes
the right hand side of (19). That is, for a given instance,
(a∗, i∗) = argmax(a1,i1)∈P\g∗1
⌈
4
∆2a1,i1
(
ρa1,i1√
τ0
+
√
6 log n+ 4 logm
)2⌉
(20)
Then, by defining ` as follows, we are assured that Equa-
tion 19 holds for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m and (a, i) ∈ L+j .
` =
⌈
4
∆2a∗,i∗
(
ρa∗,i∗√
τ0
+
√
6 log n+ 4 logm
)2 ⌉
(21)
Hence, we can bound the number of plays of our original
sub-optimal arm (a′, j′) as follows:
E[Ta′,i′(n)] ≤ `m2 +
m∑
j=1
∑
(a,i)∈L+j
n∑
t=m+1
t−1∑
s=1
t−1∑
k=`
(
P (R¯sg∗j ≤ µg∗j − c
s
g∗j
(t))
+ P (R¯ka,i ≥ µa,i + cka,i(t))
)
≤
⌈ 4m2
∆2a∗,i∗
(ρa∗,i∗√
τ0
+
√
6 log n+ 4 logm
)2⌉
+
∑
(a,i)∈P
n∑
t=1
t∑
s=1
t∑
k=1
2t−3m−2
≤ 4m
2
∆2a∗,i∗
(ρa∗,i∗√
τ0
+
√
6 log n+ 4 logm
)2
+ 2(1 + log(n)).
As a direct consequence of Theorem 2, we can bound the
regret of the MatchGreedy-EpochUCB policy.
Corollary 1 (Regret Bound for UCB). Consider α as the
MatchGreedy-EpochUCB algorithm and suppose that
τk = τ0 + ζk with τ0 ≥ 1. The regret bound is
Rα(n) ≤
∑
(a,i)∈S
(
4m2
∆2a∗,i∗
(ρa∗,i∗√
τ0
+
√
6 log n+ 4 logm
)2
+ 2(1 + log(n))
)(
∆a,i +
Ca,i
τ0
)
+
mC∗
ζ
(
1 + log
(
ζ(n− 1)
τ0
+ 1
))
,
where (a∗, i∗) is an edge defined in (20) and ρa∗,i∗ and
Ca,i are edge-specific constants.
C UCB ALGORITHM
C.1 INITIAL PLAY OF UCB ALGORITHM
Since the UCB algorithm estimates the average reward
for each edge (a, i), it is customary to initialize a prelim-
inary round where each arm is played exactly once. In
the absence of any capacity constraints (e.g., bξl = m
for all ξl ∈ C), it is easy to compute a sequence of m
matchings so that every edge in P belongs to exactly one
of these matchings. We now present a procedure that
achieves the same effect even in the presence of arbitrary
capacity constraints.
Algorithm 3 Computation of disjoint matchings that
play each arm once
1: function MATCHINGS-INITIALPLAY(P)
2: E ← P . Edges not yet selected
3: i← 1 . Index for current matching
4: while E 6= ∅ do
5: F ← E . Feasible set for current matching
6: M ← ∅
7: while F 6= ∅ do
8: Select any (a, i) ∈ F
9: if M ∪ (a, i) does not violate (P1) then
10: M ←M ∪ (a, i)
11: else
12: F ← F \ (a, i).
13: end if
14: end while
15: Mi ←M , i← i+ 1, E ← E \M .
16: end while
17: return M1,M2, . . . ,Mi−1
18: end function
Informally, in some iteration i, the above algorithm
greedily selects edges for matching Mi without violat-
ing the capacity constraints. When no additional edge
can be added toMi—a maximal matching—we move on
to the next iteration.
Unfortunately, the number of matchings returned by this
procedure can be quite large—in the worst case this can
be as large as m2, where m is the number of agents or
incentives. However, for more reasonable instances such
as the ones considered in our simulations, we observe
that the number of initial matchings required to play each
edge at least once is much closer to the lower bound of
m.
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Figure 4: Figure 4a presents results demonstrating how the performance of our algorithm varies with the number of states given
that the number of agents and incentives is fixed for two instances of each configuration. Figure 4b shows how the performance
of the algorithm varies with the number of agents and incentives given that the number of states is fixed for two instances of each
configuration.
Algorithm 4 Environment Implementation for Pulling a
Matching (Set of Arms)
1: function INCENT(M , tn, n τ0,ζ)
2: rtna,i ← 0 ∀(a, i) ∈M
3: for t ∈ [tn, tn + τ0 + ζn− 1] do
4: for (a, i) ∈M do
5: offer incentive i to agent a
6: receive reward rθa,ta,i
7: rtna,i ← rθ,ta,i + rtna,i
8: end for
9: end for
10: return (rtna,i)(a,i)∈M
11: end function
D ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS
D.1 COMPARISON OF TRADITIONAL UCB
AND MG-EUCB FOR SIMPLE EXAMPLE
We return to the simple two-agent two-incentive instance
depicted in Figure 1. We ignore the capacity constraints
by assuming that there is a single class C1 such that ev-
ery edge belongs to this class and bC1 = 2. Clearly,
this instance only admits two unique matchings M∗ =
{(a1, i1), (a2, i2)}—the optimum matching—and M =
{(a1, i2), (a2, i1)}—the sub-optimal matching.
As discussed previously, any traditional bandit approach
that ignores the evolution of agent rewards would con-
verge to the sub-optimal matching, i.e., M . To see why,
observe that every time the algorithm selects the match-
ingM , both the agents’ states are reset to θ1 . Following
this, when the algorithms ‘explores’ the optimum match-
ing, the reward consistently happens to be zero since the
agents are in state θ1. Owing to this, the traditional ap-
proach largely underestimates the rewards for the (edges
in the) optimum matching and converges to M .
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Figure 6: Comparison of the performance of classical UCB
algorithms for matching problems versus the MatchGreedy-
EpochUCB algorithm for the example depicted in Figure 1.The
length of horizon was n = 5000.
To validate this experimentally, we compare the perfor-
mance of our MatchGreedy-EpochUCB algorithm de-
scribed in Algorithm 2 to a conventional implementa-
tion of the UCB algorithm for matching problems (e.g.,
as in (Chen et al., 2016; Gai et al., 2011; Kveton et al.,
2015)). More specifically, we consider an implementa-
tion that runs for a total of
∑k
i=1 τk for some suitable
set of parameters—in each iteration, the algorithm se-
lects a matching based on the empirical rewards and the
confidence bound. The iterations are then divided into
rewards for convenience and the time-average reward in
each epoch is computed and plotted alongside the same
metric for the MG-EUCB algorithm in Figure 6.
Our simulations support our prior conclusions. For ex-
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Figure 5: Bike-share experiments with utility model: Figures 5a and 5b compare the efficiency of the bike-share system with two
demand models and a utility based behavioral model under incentive matchings selected by MG-EUCB+ with upper and lower
bounds given by the system performance when the incentive matching is given by computing the optimal greedy matching at each
epoch based on the current state information and when no incentives are offered respectively.
ample, after 5000 epochs, the classical UCB algorithm
selects the sub-optimal matching over 99% of the time.
Owing to this reason, the classical algorithm has a re-
gret that grows linearly with the length of the horizon
whereas the regret of our algorithm is almost zero for
this instance.
D.2 ADDITIONAL SYNTHETIC
EXPERIMENTS
In our synthetic simulations we fixed the num-
ber of agents, incentives, and states equally as
m = |A| = |I| = |Θa| = 10. We now present results in
Figure 4 evaluating how the performance of our algo-
rithm varies with each of these parameters. In Figure 4a,
we observe that when the number of agents and incen-
tives is fixed, the number of states has a negligible im-
pact on the rate of convergence to the optimal solution.
This indicates that within this range of states the Markov
chains mix rapidly and the edge dependent constants in
the regret bound do not significantly factor in. We find
in Figure 4b, as predicted by our regret bounds, the con-
vergence slows as the number of agents in the problem
increases.
D.3 ADDITIONAL BIKE-SHARE
DESCRIPTION AND EXPERIMENTS
In this section we provide further motivation for the bike-
sharing problem as a matching problem, more detail on
our problem setup, as well as additional experimental
results. Bike-share programs must deal with varying
spatio-temporal demand to ensure that a high percent-
age of demand is met in order to satisfy customers and
maximize profit. To avoid both pile-ups of bikes at pop-
ular destinations and depletion of bikes at stations with
high demand, bike sharing companies manually replen-
ish and manipulate the spatial supply of bikes. This is
costly to companies and an alternative is to attempt to
incentivize users to alter their paths in order to balance
the spatial supply of bikes in such a way that meets fu-
ture demand. A successful incentive system could reduce
the need for manually replenishing the supply of bikes at
stations, saving money and time as a result.
Figure 7: Heatmap of the scaled initial supply of the Boston
Hubway stations. Each bubble indicates the location of a sta-
tion and are scaled in size and colored according to the number
of bikes available at the station.
We consider the bike-share problem as a repeated game
in our simulations. Specifically, at each epoch users
move into the system seeking a bike from a station
Figure 8: This heatmap shows the spatial reduction in the num-
ber of rejections at each station in epoch 20000 from epoch
1000 corresponding to the result in Figure 3a. Positive num-
bers indicate how many fewer rejections occurred at the station
at the later epoch than the earlier epoch. We observe a global
reduction spatially in rejections nearly uniformly.
while simultaneously users transition from the location
in which they picked up a bike to a location where they
drop off the bike. In our simulations we allow the spa-
tial supply of bikes to evolve based on the transitions of
bikes between stations. We begin each simulation with
the supply at each station given by the data scaled by a
factor of two. As a result we have over 6000 agents in
the system that can move between close to 200 stations.
We experimented with static and random demand models
using quantities derived from the data. In the static de-
mand model we set the demand between a directed pair
of stations at each epoch to be the empirical mean of the
number of transitions between the stations within 12PM–
1PM at each day over June, 2017 – August, 2017. In our
random demand model we used the empirical means as
the parameter of a Poisson distribution from which we
sampled the demand at each epoch for each directed pair
of stations. To justify this choice we have included sev-
eral representative probability mass functions for the de-
mand between stations and the Poisson distributions that
were fit to them in Figure 9. We also applied goodness
of fit tests to ensure this was a realistic modeling choice.
In our simulations we considered two behavioral models
of the users in the system that govern how rewards are
produced as well as the probability of a user accepting
an incentive. As touched upon previously, in our bike-
share model, associated with the state of a user are a dis-
tance threshold parameter and a parameter of a Bernouilli
distribution. The distance threshold gives the maximum
distance a user is willing to be re-routed and is drawn uni-
formly at random for each state in [0, 4000] meters. The
Bernouilli parameter gives the probability that a user will
accept an incentive below its distance threshold for a par-
ticular state and is drawn uniformly at random in [0, 1].
In the primary behavioral model we consider based on a
Bernouilli distribution presented in Figure 3, if the dis-
tance between the two stations of the proposed incen-
tive is less than the threshold parameter associated with
an agent’s state the agent will accept the incentive with
probability p and give a reward of one, otherwise the
incentive will be rejected and a reward of zero will be
given. We also investigate a utility-based model; this
model is the same as the Bernouilli based model with the
slight modification that if an incentive is accepted fol-
lowing a successful realization of the Bernouilli draw, a
reward is given that is proportional to the difference in
distance between the threshold associated with a users
state and the distance between the station the user in-
tended to go to and the station of the proposed incentive.
We now give an overview of our results and the addi-
tional experiments we present in this section. We make
two key favorable observations from the simulations in
Figure 3 in which we investigated static and random de-
mand with the Bernoulli behavioral model. First, com-
pared to a naive baseline of the convergence of the sys-
tem without any incentives our algorithm is able to in-
crease the efficiency of the system approximately 40%
with the static demand model. Furthermore, the exten-
sion to random demand does not reduce the performance
significantly. When comparing to an upper bound on per-
formance we observe that our algorithm leads the system
to approach this limit.
The mean matching rewards presented in Figure 3c can
be interpreted as the mean number of incentives that are
accepted and equivalently the mean of users re-routed.
This result indicates that on average less than 1% of users
are matched to an incentive. This is a highly desirable
property as it means we only need to influence a small
part of the population in order to get significant perfor-
mance gains. As a result, most users will only benefit
from the incentive system, while from the planners per-
spective the minuscule cost of incentivizing only a small
portion of the population is a beneficial.
We now show the results in Figure 5 of the static and
random demand in combination with the utility based be-
havioral model. We generally draw the same conclusions
as from Figure 3 with somewhat lower performance for
the system. This is an expected result as the users are
more sensitive to the extra distance they must travel due
to an incentive and they are therefore more difficult to
incentivize. We note that we observed looking at the ad-
ditional distances traveled due to an accepted incentive,
that users under the utility based model do travel mod-
estly less additional distance as a result of accepting an
incentive than when we used the Bernouilli based model.
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Figure 9: Each empirical probability mass function in the figure gives the probability on the number of users that transitioned
between a pair of stations in the Boston Hubway dataset between 12PM–1PM each day between June, 2017 – August, 2017. The
red lines show the Poisson distribution that we fit to the distributions that we sampled from to generate random demand at each
epoch of the simulation.
E IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We make a small modification to the number of iterations
within an epoch to reduce computation time of the MG-
EUCB algorithm. Specifically when the time-averaged
reward has changed by no more than 5 × 10−4 be-
tween consecutive iterations for 200 iterations in a row—
indicating the time averaged reward has converged—we
end the epoch early. We find that this leads to the num-
ber of iterations in an epoch being roughly in the range of
1000-1500. We observe this leads to a negligible change
in the mean and cumulative rewards of the algorithm
while significantly speeding up computation over a large
horizon.
F Discussion
In this work we developed a bandit algorithm for match-
ing incentives to users, whose preferences are unknown
a priori and evolving dynamically in time, in a resource
constrained environment. We theoretically analyzed the
problem and derived logarithmic gap-dependent regret
bounds. There are several interesting future lines of work
that we believe are worth pursuing.
In this work, under the MDP dynamics we only inves-
tigated the combinatorial optimization problem of re-
source constrained matching and our proof techniques
relied on the properties of the greedy matching paradigm.
In future work, we are interested in attempting to extend
this work to arbitrary combinatorial optimization prob-
lems with constraints in the case that the designer is al-
lowed oracle access to solve the optimization problem,
as has been done in the case without dynamics (Kveton
et al., 2015; Wen et al., 2015).
The resource constraints that we considered were static
over time. It is often the case that constraints of this form
are time-varying or coupled over the decision-making
horizon. A prominent example in online resource allo-
cation is the Adwords problem. Due to the practical sig-
nificance, we plan to explore if our model can be adapted
to capture this richer class of constraints.
Finally, we would like to make our model increasingly
realistic from the designer’s and agents’ perspectives.
From the designer’s point of view, this would be to incor-
porate incentive compatibility and fairness constraints.
From the perspective of the agent, beyond the MDP dy-
namics, strategic behavior will be important to model and
assess the impacts of going forward.
